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-------------------------IN THE SUPREME Q)lJRr OF

'IHE

STATE OF lITAH
TRA:lSPOl-iER :-1ANlJFACIDRING,
~~::.'., a t ':ah corp::>ration,
,.rd !;D; ''· 'iELSTEN, an
1

2.r1:::i1 v.:. lucl,

Plaintiffs/Resp::indents,
Case No. 19214

'5.

"'REE-WIW:; Tl:RBINE Q)RFQRATION,

cnq:y)ra+:.ion, and
LA:RD B. GC3L.'lS, an individual,

:t Ut3l-i

D2fendants/Appellants,

RESroNDlliTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal by D2fendants/.~pellants from a Judgment by
;fess 1
"' '.

:

lJ

contere:l pursuant to the terms of a Promissory i'bte by the Third
Dic"trict Court for Salt Lake County, State of Uta.'1, the Honorable
:-i'L'1Son, Judge, on March 3, 1983, and an Amended Judgment by

~''

·, "" 1

" •'rile.u2d ~1'1y 17, 1983, as 1vell as an appeal from an Order of the
u1e fr)norable Judi th M. Billings, Judge, entered April 22, 1983,

:' "/11q .iµ;::>cl lants' l"btion to Set Aside the Judgment.
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DISRJSITION

THE LDWER OJURI'

.':...~

Judgment by Confession was entered against App.ellants upon the
application of Respondents on M3.rch 3, 1983.

On April 22, 1983, llppellants'

l'btion to Set Aside the Judgment pursua:-it to Rule GO(o) of the Utah Rule_; ):
Civil Procedure was denied by the Honorole Judith M. Billings.

An Amend·~

Judgment was entered by Stipulation of the parties on 11ay 17, 1983.
NATURE OF RELIEF SQLX:;li-i' ON APPEAL

Respondents seek an Order a:finning u1e Judgment and the District
Court's denial of Appellants' l'btion to Set Aside the Judgment.

Respomler:'=s

also seek an award of attorneys' fees incurred in =nnection ·.;ith Appellants'
post-Judgment motions below as well as fees incurred on appeal.
srATEME..~

A.

OF FACI'S

Objections to Appellants' Statement of Facts.
Al though Appellants have failed to cite the portions of tI'.e

record which they believe support the statements contained in their Statement
of Facts, Respondents believe that the following "facts" set forth in
Appellants' Brief find absolutely no support in the record:
l.

"Defendants were in desperate need o: funds" when u1ey

lx>rrowed money from Plaintiffs.

[Appellants' Brief, pg. 4, line l]

absolutely no evidence that tJ1e Defendants were in
2.

desperat~

'ITiere wa,

need of fun i~.

"Prior notes pr".:lvided that under sor;ie circumstances the

evidenced by the note could simply be set off against any amount ti1e
Plaintiffs a.ved Defendants when all disputes were resolved.

Th•

3

agreef:'.en:.

which was executed with the last Promissor1 Note has the same ;orY1ision."
[Appellants' Brief, pg. 4, lines 7-ll]

The only prior ?::'om.issocJ '.bte

S•,'
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y-"

er"' -~,,, _:u,~r~

.-<d.3

a ?r·.xnsscry ibte for $10,000.00 dated January 20, 1983

Juj .vlucn pr.-:Nided that F.espondents ·.;ould i-uwe the option of applying any

-"",,mes 1.ie pursuar.t t-:i t.'1e note against a.'1y present or future sums, if any,

.-1;,1 ch may be owi:19 to llppellant Free--\'ilng and that in the event Respondents
electe·J not to so apply the a.J:Dunts due LL'1der the note, the a.C\Ounts due under
t:ce nute wo1_:_1-j be ;_:eid without any right of

o~fset

or abatement.

The

?romi:;sor; rote which is the subject of this action [T .10] and the Settlement
.:...:;reement entered into by the parties at the same time [T.32] contained
·osserct1ally t:'e sa;;ie provision.
3.

"Tua more lawsuits growing out of the same transactions,

··.::c-..:rrences c>.'1d events leading up to this la1-1suit have been filed in Third
::Jis•..r1ct Court."
ev1 lence
r~.e

[Appellants' Brief, pg. 5, lines 17-19]

There was no

b2fore the District Court that the indebtedness rn-1ed OJ Appellants on

SclbJect ?r->missory :-late arose out of the "same transactions, occurrences

dlld events" as the tv.o other lawsuits referred to other than the bald
cJndJsion conuined in Appellant Lai::d B. Gogins' Affidavit that he had
"numerous counterclaims against Plaintiffs, which claims arise from the same
cransac':ic:ns and occurrences as does the ?r·omissory 0bte."
B.

Respondents' Statement of Facts.

A.3 of February 7,
_')1-_,-,H'l t:~·J

··H•eoeJ:Jc;nt

[T. 20]

1983, certain disputes existed bet.veen the parties

a Sales License Agree:uent dated August 24, 1981, and a License
,Jetted December 1981.

As of that date,

Respondents had also r:iade

oc ou3 l·XiJ1s to Appellants [T.32], including a $10,000.00 loan evidenced by a
Pr -'mlssury :1,Jte dated January 20, 1983, which was due and payable on or before

'"orwr/ 1, 1983 [T.3\)].

The disputes bet·.-1een the parties were at that time

-4-

being negotiated and the parties 1vere each represented by counsel in
connection with such negotiations [T .136].

As part of such negotiations,

,y

Agreement dated February 8, 1983 was negotiated and entered into by the
parties with advice of counsel [T.32].

PJrsuant to t.'ie terms of that

A:Jreement, Resp::mdents agreed to and did in fact loan to Appellants an
additional $10,000.00, and Appellants agreed to and did in fact execute in
favor of Resp::inents the Promissory Note which is the subject of this action ic.
the principal sum of $52,324.40, payable together with interest at the rate,,
21% per annum on or before February 21, 1983 [T.10-12].

Appellants'

signatures on the Promissory Note were notarized.
Paragraph 3 of the A:Jreement [T.33] specifically proviJed that in
the event the parties were not able to reach a resolution concerning their
disputes under the Sales License A:Jreement and the License Agreement, a.•d in
the event Respondents did not elect to apply the am:::mnt due under the
Promissory Note to amounts, if any, then due or due in the future under t.'ie
Sales License Agreement and/or License Agreement, that the Promissory N::>te
v.Duld be payable by Appellants "strictly" on or before February 21, 1983
"without any right of offset or abatement".

The Promissory Note dated

February 7, 1983 [T.10] also provided that, "the amounts due pursuant to the
terms of this Promissory Note are not subject to any right of offset."
The subject Promissory Note executed by Appellants cont'1ined t..'ie
followin:i Confession of Judgment provision:

"In the event t.'iis note is not paid in full according to
the terms herein set forth, the undersigned do hereby
consent and authorize the payor to enter judgment against
them for the aroc>unt of the principal, interest and oth~r costs
incurred in obtaining said judgment."

-5-

.'flJ:)elL,nts represented and warranted as part of the subject note that, "this
I'r,J1111ss<X'J Not-= is enforceabl'2 according to its terms."
Appellants did not pay any portion of the Promissory Note as agreed
[T.3].

Thereafter, and on or alxlut March 2, 1983, Respondents, pursuant to

Utah C£de Annotated, Section 78-22-3, and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
5&'\(e), filed a Verified Statement for Judgment by Confession signed by
Appellant Transpower Manufacturing, Inc. [T.2-7], which incorporated by
ref-=rence as an Exhibit a copy of the subject Promissory Note.

Thereafter, on

i'Brch 3, 1?83, a Judgment by Confession was signed by the lbnorable Timothy R.
Hanson, Judge, which Judgment was docketed March 4, 1983 at 8:12 A.M. [T.8].
On April 7, 1983, Appellants filed a l'btion to Set Aside the

Judgment by Confession [T.13].

In support of such motion, Appellants filed

the Affidavit of Appellant Laird B. Cogins, in which Mr. Cogins simply stated
that he had never been served with a Summons and Complaint, that at the time
he executed the Promissory Note his counsel assured him that Judgment could
not be taken against him without notice and an opportunity to be heard and
that he believed t.'1at he had:

>Ja..iever,
0

"good and substantial defenses on the merits to whatever
claims Plaintiffs may assert in this action. Furthermore,
I have and intend to assert numerous counterclaims a3ainst
Plaintiffs, which claims arise from the same transactions
and occurrences as does the Promissory Note." [T.19-20].
no evidence whatsoever was presented to the Court by Appellants in

Jch Affidavit or otherwise that

Appellants had any meritorious defense to

enforcement of the PromissorJ Note [T.42].

Nor did Appell;;nts even state what

purported defenses they had.
A hearin:i was held on Apf>2llants' 1-btion to Set Aside the Judgment
,Jn April 14, 1983, and the motion was denied by the Court by Order dated April
22, 1983 [T.41].
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On !'By 11, 1983, Appellants filed a cbtice cf Af~:ieal, ·3ivin] :1<ctc

of their appeal to C1is Court of the Judgment entered :·B.rci1 3, l9u3, 'ind ,,
the denial of their tbtion to Set Aside that Judgment.

~1ereafter,

and ur. '.·\'

17, 1983, an Amended Judgment by Confession <.1as entered deleting a five
percent rate penalty 1-.hich had been included in C1e orqinal Judgment
[T.271-272].

This Amended Judgment was entered pursuw.t to sti;:iulation of

parties [T.267-268]. 1

The subject Promissor1 :.Jote contains an attorneys' fee provisi·=·" '""
on !'By 31, 1983, Respondents filed a tbtion to

~bdify

the Judgment to

irc::c'~'

an award of attorneys' fees incurred with respect to the post-Judgment motior,·
of Appellants [T.284].

'Ihat rrotion was denied by the Court solely on the

basis that the case was on appeal so the Court lacked jurisdiction [T.314].

As stated in Appellants' Brief [pgs.

5~],

two other lawsuits are

presently pending between the parties ccncerning the Sales License Agree:cent
and License Agreerrent.

fbwever, the subject matter of those actions is not

related to the Promissory Note which is the subject of this lawsuit
[T.135-136].

Appellants attack the Judgment of the District Court: on the

9row1.~s

that the required statutor1 prscedures were not followed and that the Ucah
statutes authc,dzing Judgments b'J Confession are W1CCnsti tutiona 1.

For th<'

reasons set forth below, it is respectfully submitted tha.t ".hese argwnce: :" ·"
should be rejected and the Judgment afEinned.

1 Al though the Notice of Appeal filed by Appellants does no':
specifically state they appeal from the Amende·J .JuJ9:nent aid ir :.H:c ':'ce
N:::>tice of .'\ppeal was filed prior to entr_/ of the 'c1•.>:-.• le·l J·~·'T":.t,
Resr:ondents do not assert t11ese omissions a.s jr-C>l.m L; ~ JL -11.),11~S' 0 lt:--::J t-__he
appeal.
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THE JUCGMEN'I'

,,p,s

App?llants argue that

PROPERLY ENTERED PURSUANT 'IO srATIJ'IORY

~le ~udgment

by C:>nfession was not entered in

~ .. c.,dance

with s'-:e statutory authorization therefor because the notarized

»r.,m1

Note executed by Apr:ellants and filed by Resp::mdents in this action

~sor/

C:Jd not meet the requirements of Rule SSA(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil

.'rocedur2.

-".pr:ellants have cited no acithori ties which support their various

aqunents on pr=edural deficiencies and it is Respondents position that the
?~omissor1

Note filed with the C:>urt was in fact sufficient to comply with the

statutory requirements.
Apr:ellants first argue that the Prorussory Note is insufficient
·oPcause it is not "verified".

P.owever, it was uncontradicted that the

?r•i,1issor1 tlote '"'as notarized.

The purpose of requiring verification is

twofold:

L~e

First, to assure that

·" h.ct that of the debtor.
lebtccr

ag~inst

signature on the confession of judgment is

Second, to attempt to protect creditors of the

fraudulent judgments being entered to protect the debtor's

;ssets from his creditors.

The first purpose of the requirement was clearly

satisfied in t.'le present case by notarization of the Promissory l:bte.

The

o•"Jni req11irement is for the protection of creditors and not the debtor.

P<?•'O<pizi:ig this fact, tJ1e wurts have held that as between the parties the
'<I

ir.c>

to have a verified statement dC€s not affect the validity of a

··J•lgrr,ent bj• wnfession.
i

•)~),

Thus, in Barnes v. Hilton, 239 P.2d 966, 970 (Kan.

b1e CDurt stated:

"Apr:ellant does not contend that the California attorney
'"'ho fikd the confc->ssion c•f judgment in the California
court included uierein anything he ..ias not authorized by
the C'__)(j.10Vl ts in :11~ r9s1:ect i ve notes to incl~de in such a
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statement. His real cxintention apoears t~ be that :~e
respective cognovits are ineffective because his signature
thereto was not verified by his oath. \'le thi:-ik t!1e p?int
not well taken . . . The cognovi ts are parts of ::. 11e
contracts that defendant was privileged to make, and as
between the
rties there is Clo reason whv he is nut ()<)1,;nd
thereby."
Emphasis addedJ
In the present case, Appellants do not contend that they did not execute the
Promissory N:Jte or that the Promissory N:lte did not truthfully set forth the
indebtedness owin::i by Appellants.

Consequently, they cannot complain that r.;,,

note was not verified.
Appellants next argue that the Promissory Note is insufficient
because it does not expressly state that any sum is "justly" due or to becane
due.

However, the aut.>-iorities do not require that the statement specificall:.

state that the swn is "justly due".

It is sufficient if, as in t.1-ie present

case, the Promissor1 Note shows from the facts stated therein that the debt
due or to tie=rne due.

Thus, in 49 C.J.S. Judgments, Section 159 at 291, th€

authors state:
"Under some statutes, the statement, in addition to
setting forth the facts or. which the indebtedness arose,
must also show that the sum confessed is justly due or to
become due. It has been held, however, that this does not
require the confession to state in terms that the sum for
which the judgment is :::or.fessed is justly due or to become
due, if such fact appears from the other facts set fort.'1;
arrl, where the statement sets forth facts showing a just
debt and the amount thereof, it need not in terms negative
that it has been fBid 0r otherwise discharged."
Appellants also argue t..at the Promis5ory C0te does not authorize
the entry of Judgment for a specified

SJJII

1:::8cause the note only authorize·'

entry of Judgment for "the amount of principal, iciterest and
incurred in obtaining said judgrrent".

o~her

c..--csts

However, the amount of the princirril

owed and the interest rate are set forth explicitly in the Promissory "ot<e
itself so that all that is required to determ"ne t.1-ie 3...CDunt 0f the

Ju.jg;nen~

-9-

-,,,- .. ,,_c;ed is a mathe:natical calculation based up:m the precise figures set
-r-:1

w t.:w Promissory Note.

J_1,J911,,nt.
1 ,,

This is sufficient s,:iecificity to support the

47 Am.Jur.2.d, Judgments Section 1132.

In addition, t.'1e provision

t11e Promissory Note that the Judgment include "ot.J-ier costs incurred in

1\JtaiCJing said judgment" simply follO\vs the statutory language of Rule 58A(e)
. ;lud-1 auC1orizes the Clerk to i:1clude costs oE entry of judgment in the

,;udgrnent ,"()nfessed and such provision is valid.
Section 1137.
i~

47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments

Furthermore, even if the $300.00 costs included in ci1e Judgment

this action were not authorized, ci1e proper course for t.'1e Court to follow

.•0t1ld be to simply delete the costs from the Judgment entered, not to set
lside t.l-ie entire Judgment.

See,

~·

Pitts v. Pine t-Eadow Ranch, Inc., 589

P. 2cl 767 ( Ut. 1978).
Finally, Appellants argue that even if the Promissory Note did meet
t.he requirements of Rule 521\(e), the Judgment was still not properly entered
--•ecause the Promissory Note was not filed for one hour and 25 mintues after
'J,e Jc1dgment was filed and did not have the Ju:lgment endorsed upon it.

'bwever, the Promissory Note was filed on l'Brch 3, 1983 prior to ci1e d=.\eting
Jf the Judgment on March 4, 1983, which is al::. that Rule 58A(e) requi:::es.

f11rther, a COP'/ of the the Promissory Note was filed an an Exhibit to the
i\ffdavi t presented to the court prior to the time the Court signed the
'·, kp·n,or1t_ ·oy '.:onfession.
"'lr--y
:L

d

,Jf

And ci1e original note was clearly filed prior to the

tJ1e Amended Judgme:1t on l'By 17.

The fact that the Clerk or Judge did

endorse upon the note "a judgment of the Court for the annunt confessed",
required at all, is simply a clerical mistake which can be corrected at any

time.

Pa•Jl1all v. Suburbio Land Companv, 579 P.2d 917 (Ut. 1978).
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In summary, it is respectfully submitted that P-esp::indents complie:

with all essential requirerrents in causing Judgment to be ente=e<J in this
action.

Even if it is assumed for purposes of argument that cer:ain minor

mistakes were made in connection

~ith

the Judgment entered, those

mista~es

not in any way prejudice or affect the rights of Appellants and Appellunts
soould not be allowed to avoid the consequences of their agreement on the
basis of technicalities which in no way prejudiced their rights.
II.

THE JtID:iME:NT DID 001' DEPRIVE APPELLANTS OF ANY O)NSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS.
Appellants contend that the Judgment entered in this action is vo'on the basis that because t.'1e Joogment was entered without notice to
Appellants and an opportunity for Appellants to be heard, Appellants were
denied their right to due process of law under tDth the Constitutions of G1e
United States a.nd t.'1e State of Utah.

.l\ppe llants concede that such due process

rights may :::e waived but argue that there was not sufficient evidence of a
waiver in the present case and that due process requires a hearing on the
question of waiver prior to entry of the Joogment by Confession.

It is

respectfully submitted that these contentions are without merit.
The United States Supreme Court and nwnerous other courts throughoc:

the country have specifically upheld the constitutionality of statutes
authorizing Judgment by Confession without prior notice or hearir.g.
~,

See,

D. H. OvermyeY C.O. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 31 L.F<l.2d 124, 133,

9~

S.ct. 775 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, .+05 U.S. 1'31, 31 L.Ed.2d 138, 92 S.Ct. Jn
Feh. den. 405 U.S. 1049, 31 L.Ed.2d 592, 92 S.Ct. 1303 (1972); Col:mial "'''.".
Trust Co. v. Cahill, 424 F.SUpp. 1200 (D. Ill. 1976); 'I'unheim v. Bowir.an, 36•
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' ':i11~1.

_j)2

(D.Nev. 1973).

See, also, Barnes v. Hilton, 239 P.2d 966 (Kan.

J>21; Coon v. Dist.::ict Court, 420 P.2d 827 (Colo. 1966); Hecker v. Bail, 431
cd ~l

(Colo. 1967); Westring v. O"leyenne National Bank, 393 P.2d 119 (Wyo .

• J64i.

In D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., supra., a case almost identical
tJ the case at bar,

the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected

.;ppeamts' constitutional argument.
~

In Overmyer, the Defendant had executed

Prom:ss.ory rote containing a cognovi t provision as part of a settlement of

:~10JS

disputes between the parties.

The parties were both represented by

co11115el in connection with the settlement negotiations and the execution of
\]1e

Froraissor1 Note.

Defendant subsequently defaulted in repayment of the

Promissor1 tlote and a Judgment by Confession was entered against Defendant
·..ii thcut any prior notice or hearing.

Defendant subsequently rroved to set

aside the Judgment, which r:otion was denied.

Defendant argued on appeal that

:,'ie Onio statute pursuant to which the Judgment had been entered was
unccnsti tutional because it did not require any prior notice or hearing before
Judgment was rendered.

The Supreme Court rejected this contention and '-'Pheld

the constitutionality of the statute.

In so ruling, the court noted that

t:ne.re was no contract of adhesion involved, nor was it a case of unequal
::.0.rgainin~

power or overreaching and concluded:
Our holding necessarily means that a cognovit clause is
not, l2'.:£ se, violative of Fourteenth Amendment due
process. Overmyer could prevail here only if the clause
were constitutionally invalid. The facts of this case, as
we observed above, are imp:irtant, and those facts amply
demonstrate that a cognovit provision may well serve a
proper and useful purp:ise in the commercial world and at
the s<12e ti'.Ile not be vulnerable tu constitutional attack.

-12Overmyer merely because of its execution of the cognovi t
note, is not rendered Jefenseless. It concedes ti1at in
Ohio the judgwent court may vacate its judgment up:m a
sh:::wing of a valid defense and, indeed, Overmyer ha.J a
post-judgment hearing in the Ohio court. If there were
defenses sud1 as prior payment or mistaken identity, thos•e
defenses could be asserted. And there is nothing we see
that prevented OVermyer from pursuing its breac.'1 of
contract claim against Frick in a proper forum."
(92
S.Ct. at 783)
Appellants cite a number of loher FeJeral Court cases for th<0
proposition that the standard for showing a waiver of constitutional rights
the same in a civil suit as in a crimina: context and that a hearing on
question of waiver must be conducted prior to entry of Judgment.

t.:~e

;,ppellant3

contend that because no prior hearing is required under the Utah statute a.'ld
Ju:l.gment could allegedly be entered by the Clerk without ever consulting a
Judge, the Utah statute is unconstitutional on its face.

2

lbwever, only one of the cases relied upon by Appellants, OsI:lOfld v.
~·

359 F.Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972), involved a Judgment by Con=ession.

'lhe facts of the other cases cited were far different from t.'1e case at
the decisions in those cases :ire not on point.

bar""'

For example, .;l,ppellants cite

G:mzales v. County of Hidaloo, 489 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1973).

In that case, :

migrant worker brought S'..!it d1allengi03 the County Housing Authority's
seizure, without notice or hearing, of all his personal belongings in his
apartment for non-payment of rent based up::in a provision in a lease sijDe<l

2rt is not clear ~ti.ether Rule 58A(e) authorizes the Clerk, rather than A
Judge, to actually sign the Judgment. That Rule simply provides that tl1c
Clerk is authorized to "enter in the Judgment d=ket a Judgment of the CJc.tr_'
for the an:ount confessed." In the event this Court believes that a J.Jd')TI'.e!'.'.
by Confession can only be constitutionally signed by a Judge, it couU S•J
interpret Rule 58A(e). In the present case there was clearly a judicial
determination that a waiver had occurred prior to the entry of t.'1e origina:
Ju:l.gment by Ju:l.ge P.ansen. Judge Billings also :nade such a deternination pr
to entry of the Amended Judgment.
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. ,"

; E::

n11

thout benefit of colJilsel authorizing such procedure.

Osmond is

""' 1:;.}uishable i:rom the case at ta.r as t..'1e Plaintiffs in that case had
,xecute-l consumer notes and there was no showing they acted with benefit of
'·bre irnp:>rtantly, as the court recognized in Tunheim v. Bowman,

: ...,msel.
~c;11~"-·-·

in upiY:,l::ling tJ1e cons ti tutionali ty of Nevada's Confession of Judgment

stc - ;·>es, the Os:xmd decision relied up::in by Appellants is directly contrary

-:: tr•e Supreir,e C.ourt 's decision in OVerrnver:
"With due respect for the Cela•..iare Court, we cannot
so interpret t.~e opin:ons and rulings of t.~e Supreme
G::>urt. The Overmyer case d1 ::l not leave the question
upen. It specifically ;,eld tJ\dt a statutory scheme
whi&. did not provide :'or notice and hearing prior to
entry of a confessed judgment did not rllil afoul of due
process requirements." (366 F.Supp. at 1394)
The rationale of the decisions cited al:ove ci1at no prior hearing on
.1.oiver is constitutionally required is that the consent signed by a Defendant
1s

pn;na facia evidence of waiver and

1

f a Defendant challenges the validity

Jf ':.ne '"ai ver, he is free, as was done in the present case, to file a t-btion

':.) Set l's ide

t.~e

Judgment.

This statutory scheme was expressly approved by

the Supreme Court in OVennyer, suora, as affording sufficient protection to a
"' fend ant .

Utah's statutory scheme for entering Judgments by confession without
o

µrLor hearinCJ on waiver is not by any means unique.

f• •er

There are a number of

:c.stdnces in which Judgments are entered without any such hearing.
For example, statutues and Court rules in Utah and t.'1roughout the

,,u,tr; authorize the entry of a Default Judgment against a Defendant upon the
fl Li r.g ·'.lf a 9ro.)f of service of the Swmrons and G::>mplaint •

The filing of a

proof Jf service sim;..>l/ constitutes prirna facia evidence that the Defendant
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was properly served with process and has failed without legal justificat1,x,
respond.

No prior hearirr:J is required to determi:-ie whether the refendant •ds

in fact properly served with the O::lrnflaint, whether the Defendant mew anJ
urrlerstcxxl. that he was required to file a respcnse to the Complaint, •,;hether
the Defendant could even read the Surrnnons and Complaint, 1vhether the I::efenda:had any legal justification for not respcnding, or any of the numerous other
issues which are clearly relevant when a Default Judgment is entered.

The

I::efendant's right to move to set aside the C€fault Judgment after the fact

is

universally deemed to be a sufficient protection of the Defendant's
constitutional rights.

Furthermore, it is not uncommon at all for statutes er

Court rules to authorize the Clerk, rather than a Judge, to enter a refault
Judgment upon the filing of a proper proof of service of the Stmnrons and
Complaint (see the Rules of the Fifth Circuit Court for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.).
Similarly, durirr:J the course of a lawsuit Judgments are entered
routinely upon the non-appearance of a party or his counsel at a hearing or
trial based solely on proof of service of notice of the hearing.

No prior

determination is required that the failure to appear at the hearing was
intentional or without legal Justification.

Again, the party against whom a

Judgment is entered is left with his remedy of moving to set aside the
Judgment if gcxxl. cause exists.
SUch a procedure is also deerr,ed by the courts to adequately pr·Jtec
the rights of a I::efendant with respect to the entry of Judgment by
Confession.
~·;

See,

~'

D. H. OVermyer Co. v. Frick. supr-a.; Earnes v. H1ltor ..

Henritze v. The &:lrden Cornpmy, 432 P.2d. 2 (Colo. 1967); ;vest:ring v,

Cheyenne National E'ank,

~·
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,;ppellancs argue t..'lat, '«hether or :-iot a prior hearing on waiver is
, r rerl, che wa1 ver of their ric;ht to notice and hearing in this case was not
'•mtanly ,rnd knowingly gi'len because at the time they executed the subject
Pr•missor1 Note, their counsel advised them that the provisions of the note by
which they authorized Resp::mdents to have Judgment entered against them were
Appellants urge this Court to adopt a blanket rule that
cne standud for shcr.;ing a '.;ai ver of one's cor.sti tutional right to notice and

'JpnJnw1i ty to be heard is the same in civil matters as in a criminal
20ntex".

From that premise, Appellants argue that although they realized they

•ere signing a note which containe:l a Confession of Judgment provision, they
jij

not knowl1ngly wai•1e their constitutional right.

This contention was made

a.>J specifically cejected by the Dist.rict Court with gcxxl reason.

Respondents do not believe that a blanket standard as to what
cJnst~tut2s

a ·.;a1ver of constitutional rights in a Confession of Judgment

contexc: can or should be adopted.

As the Supreme Court noted in OVermyer,

supra., the facts of each individual case are irnp::irtant.
standar~

Thus, a more strict

shoulJ certainly be applied in cases of adhesion cont.racts, unequal

:iargaiClicxi situations, or consumer concracts '«here attorneys are not
'nvobed.

HcJ.-1ever, it is respectfully urged that the facts of the present

c:a.,,: 31c:tate the conclusion that a valid waiver occurred.

Appellants, by their own testiITDny, clearly knew and understcxxl that
· ,,,. »ems Jf the subject Promissory Note aut..'1orized Judgrrent by Confession to

3 .'.ppellant,; also argue once again that the ·waiver contained in the note
car.not oe relied up'n because the original note was not filed for one hour and
25 minutes 3fcer U\e Judgment was entered. This argument is unavailing for
~_,~e re3.sons set fort..°1 acx.J'/e (see p.9).
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be taken against them if they jid not f>3.Y the note as agreed two weeks her,ce
and that by signing such Promissory Note they were indicating their consent

such procedure.

In fact, in executing the note, Appellants expressly

represented and warranted the note was enforceable according to its terms.
The fact that Appellants may have relied upon erroneous advice from their
attorney that the agreement they were purporti03 to make would not be
enforceable is of no consequence.

As the District Court correctly ruled, an}

mistaken legal advice which may have been given by Appellants' attorney is :x
defense to enforcement of the note.
A far stronger argument against •,;aiver of constitutional rights Char.
made by Appellants herein was rejected by the Court in the case of Copeland
Planned Fut;ires, Inc. v. Obenchin, 510 P.2d 654 (Wash. 1973).

In that case,

the Defendant, a resident of the State of Washington, had executed a

Promissory Note providing that any dispute arising out of t..'1e note would be
litigated in New York and governed by the New York Simplified Procedure for
Determination of Disputes whic'1 did away with many of the usual procedures
such as SUlllll'OnS and pleadings.

A Default Judgment had been entered against

Defendant in New York and suit was orought to have Judgment entered in the
State of Washington.

The Dezendant contended that he had not consented to

jurisdiction in New York as he had either neglected tc read tl1e Promissor;
Note or to read it carefully and he di'] not realize t.'iat the note containe·.:
such a provision.

The Court rejected this contention, stating:

"Giving defendant the full benefit of his claifils, lack of
consent is not made out. A person who signs a contractual
writing such as a note is charged with knowledge of its
contents and cannot claim that he did not read it or wa3
inattentive to its provisions." (Id. at 658)
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L> the present case, what Afpellants are really saying is that
1

1 C:1nuJh L'1<2y W1derstcod what they were agreeing to, they had a secret

in~ention
~uulJ

not to honor their agreement because they didn't think Respondents

require them to do so.

Al though Appellants' secret intention at the

ti:ne of si901ing the Pro'.Ilissory 1'bte not to perform the agreement may have
cons ti t,~':ed fraud on t..'leir part, t..'1at secret intent certainly should not
rel i,;vp them of their conttactual commitments.
III.

THE TRIAL CXJURT DID NOI' ABUSE ITS DISCREI'ION IN REFUSING TIJ

SET AS IDE THE JUD3MENT.

Appellants argue that the Disttict Court improperly denied
."f:pellants' l'btion to Set Aside the Judgment which was filed pursuant to Utah
:<tiles :Jf Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) (7).
It is well settled that a lower court has considerable discretion in
granting or denying a '.-btion to set aside a Judgment and that the lower
coLOrc:.'s decision will only be disturbed on appeal where an abuse of that
hscretion is clearly established.
~·

513 P.2d 429 (Ut. 1973).

See,

~'

Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v.

It is respectfully submitted that the

D;stnct Court acted well within its discretion in denying Appellants' Motion
t -,

Set Aside the Judgment as there was no showing made by Af:pellants that they

1-1,'

1

,nc,ri torious defense to enforcement of the Promissory Note.
Appellants contend in their Brief that other disputes exist which

-n '

r:se

ti\p subject of ot.'1er litigation between the parties which allegedly give
t:)

some unspecified defense to this action.

1'b showing whatsoever was

made CJ}• ,;p[:iellants below as to any defense oC.'1er than the bare allegation that
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a defense existed [T.19-20].

Further, the evidence before !J1e District QJ,u

was uncontradicted that the Promissory Note \.:hich is the subject of tl1is
action arose out of settlement discussions between G'1e parties.

lbth the

Promissory Note and a separate agreement were executed contemporaneously.

".'he

Settlement Agreement [T .139] specifically recognized that other disputes
existed between the parties which they were attempting to resolve at the time
the note was executed.

Significantly, paragraph 3 of that agYeement

specifically provided that the amounts due under the Promissory Note, "shall
be paid strictly within the time set forth therein without any right of off5€:
or abatement." [T.140]

Consequently, it is clear that the parties expressly

agreed that the other disputes which existed between the parties would not
constitute a defense to payment of the Promissory Note and that Appellants
were absoiutely obligated to pay that Promissory N::>te regardless of the
outcome of the other disputes existin:i between the parties.
The Courts in a number of states have held that before a Judgment bi
Confession will be set aside, the Defendant must come forward with facts
dem:instratin:i that he has a meritorious defense to the Plaintiff's claim.
See,~··

Eames v. P.ilton,

~·;

Henritze v. The Bordon Company, supra.:

Coon v. District Court, suora.; Hecker v. Eail, supra.; Westrirg v. Oleyenne
National Eank,

~·

For example, in Henritze v. The Pordon Company. the

Court, in refusing to set aside such a Judgnent, observed:
"When a l!Dtion to vacate a judgment is made .
it
must allege a defense which is prima facia
meritorious; and also, it must be stated with such
particularity that the court can s~ that it is a
substantial and meritorious defense, and not merely a
tedmical or a frivilous one." (432 P.2d at 2)
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,-ln,1i cic; Eai led to make cny showing t.l-iat they had a meritorious defense in this

act icn, Appellants were not entitled to have the Judgment set aside and the
-,istrict :Ourt clearly acted well within its discretion in denying Appellants'

IV.

RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED 'IO AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATIORNEYS'

rc'LS lNCTJRRED L'l ffiNNECI'ION WITH APPELLANTS' rosr-JUDSMENT i'IOI'IONS AND ON 'IHIS

APPEAL

The Promissory Note which is the subject of this action contains a
provision for attorneys' fees [T.10].

The Judgment by Confession which was

entered in this action did not contain an award of attorneys' fees because
11 ttle time was spent by Respondents' attorneys in connection with the
entering of t.l-ie original Judgment.

However, after the Judgment was entered,

substantial time was spent by Resp:indents' attorneys in litigating Appellants'
''bti.:x1 to 52 t Aside the Judgment, t-btion to Stay Execution Without the Filing

of a Supersedeas Pond, and Objection to the Order Denying Appellants' 1-btion
+_•J

Set Aside the Judgment.

Respondents subsequently filed a

~btion

in the District Court to

''Di1 fy the Judgment to add the arrount of fees which they had incurred in

-, "'n""'t ion with the p:ist-Judgment motions.

Resp'.)ndents sought an award of

,,_t,1rc1e:/s' fees in the amount of $11,300.00 based up'.)n a detailed Affidavit of
PPspondents' counsel setting forth the time which had been expended in
"'1:111PCUon .,ith such matters [T.286].

That motion was denied by the District

Court solely on the basis that this appeal had already beP...n filed and the
Court lacked jcrisdiction.

-2(}-

A Court has the innerent power to rrodi fy a Judgment within a
reasonable time to include attcrneys' fees where a party is enti tl2d to an
award of attorneys' fees.

Braat v. Andrews, 514 P.2d 540 (Ore. 1973)

It ts

respectfully submitted that this Court should mc<li fy the Judgment entered
below by adding

L~ereto

the attorneys' fees incurred by Respondents in

cormection with the post-Judgment motions, or, in the alternative, remand the
case to the District Court for a determination of the amount of attorneys'
fees to be awarded in connection with such l!Dtions.
In addition, it is respectfully submitted that Respondents are
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees incurred in connection with this
appeal.

Manage.-;ient Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406

(Ut. 1980)

Respondents have filed with this Court an Affidavit setting forte

the amount of attorneys' fees incurred in connection with this appeal and
would request an award in the sum of $2,565.00.
UJNCilJSION

As part of a negotiated settlement and with L'le advice of counsel,

Appellants voluntarily executed the Promissory l'bte and contemporaneous
Agreement which are the subject of this lawsuit, requiring them to pay, two
weeks hence, the amount of the Promissory l'bte without offset or abatement '.er
the other disputes existin:i between the parties.

Respondents cor.iplied in a;i

essential respects with the necessary procedures to have J,Jdgment by
Confession entered.

'"o good reason exists to grant relief to Appellants fur

the Judgment, especially considering the fact that Appellants wholly faileJ

1

present any evidence of even a colorable defense to enforcer.ient of the
Promissory l'bte and it is clear from L~e specific provisions of the note \:hO'.
no defense exists.
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\,hat Appellants really seek to ac=mplish by this appeal is to delay
e:icry ::>f Judgment on the note until the disputes on other agreements between
d•e fErties are litigated.
,'\p[.>2 l

Such a result was specifically bargained away by

lants when they executed the subject note and agreement in order to

"'' lw:fo'

Resp:indents to make the subject loan.

This Court should not allow

Appellants to avoid the consequences of their bargain.
DATED this

)

9 'ti day of

August, 1983.

